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Abstract. The goal of this paper is to critically evaluate a heuristic al-
gorithm for the Inverse Banzhaf Index problem by Laruelle and Widgre´n.
Few qualitative results are known about the approximation quality of
the heuristics for this problem. The intuition behind the operation of
this approximation algorithm is analysed and evaluated. We found that
the algorithm can not handle general inputs well, and often fails to im-
prove inputs. It is also shown to diverge after only tens of iterations. We
present three alternative extensions of the algorithm that do not alter the
complexity but can result in up to a factor 6.5 improvement in solution
quality.
1 Introduction
Many decisions are made using voting. A good example of voting are the presi-
dential elections of the United States of America. This follows a two-step process,
which nicely illustrates two types of voting. In the first step the citizens vote in
each state. Every vote has the same weight and the candidate with the most
votes in that state wins that state. The second step illustrates another type of
voting: weighted voting. In this step every state votes for the candidate that won
in that state. However, it would not be fair if each state has the same vote: the
state of California represents over 37 million citizens while little over 560,000 live
in Wyoming. Therefore each state has a certain weight, represented by a number
of electors. The new president is then chosen by the majority of electors.
With such weighted voting situations, and especially when they are used to
elect one of the most powerful men on earth, it is the question how fair the
voting is. We can measure this, for example, by using the Banzhaf power index
[2] and comparing that to a fair power distribution. Instead of trying to create
a fair index – which is much more a philosophical and political question, rather
than an algorithmic problem – we try to find a distribution of weights of which
the power index matches a target power index.
For this we first introduce the problem in a formal way and present an
overview of some existing algorithms for this problem. Then we will discuss
and analyse one of the algorithms and try to improve it, after which we evaluate
the algorithm and our modifications.
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22 Problem statement
The first step to measuring power is modeling a weighted voting situation, using
a weighted voting game (WVG). A weighted voting game consists of a set N
of n players p1, p2, . . . pn, each with a voting weight w1, w2, . . . wn, along with a
quota q. We write a WVG as [q;w1, . . . , wn]. A coalition C is a subset of players,
and every coalition has a value v(C) ∈ {0, 1}. A coalition with value 1 is called
winning, and a coalition with value 0 is called losing.
A generally accepted (though not the only) method to measure a priori power
is the Banzhaf power index [2]. It measures the power of a player i by dividing
the number of coalitions of other players for which player i is critical (meaning
that the coalition is losing, and that player i can make it winning by joining
it), by the total number of coalitions of other players [10]. Or in mathematical
terms:
β˜i =
1
2n − 1
∑
C⊆N
(v(C)− v(C\{pi})).
Often not the regular Banzhaf index is used, but the normalized version [10].
This abstraction is made when it is not interesting in how many cases players
can actually exert power, but only how the power is distributed among players.
Because that is what we need, we use the normalized Banzhaf index as well:
βi =
β˜i
n∑
j=1
β˜j
Just computing the power of a weighted voting game is an NP-hard problem
[11] (see [4] for a thorough survey of problems related to power indices and
algorithms for solving them). However, our goal is not to measure power. Our
goal is to find a quota and an assignment of weights, such that the power is
distributed the way we want. Because we use the Banzhaf power index to define
the power distribution, our problem is the inverse Banzhaf problem. Formally
written it looks as follows:
Given a target power index t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn), find a weighted vot-
ing game (in weighted representation) g = [q;w1, . . . , wn] such that the
Banzhaf index of g is as close to t as possible, according to some distance
measure.
3 Current algorithms
De Keijzer, Klos and Zhang propose a method to enumerate all weighted voting
games for a given number of agents [5]. This algorithm can be used to find a
voting game that is closest to a given target vector t: enumerate over all possible
games, calculate the Banzhaf index for every game and store every game for
which the resulting Banzhaf index is closer to t according to the distance measure
3than the best game found so far. Finally, output the best game found. Their
algorithm runs in O(2n
2+2n), and calculating the Banzhaf index takes O(2n)
time. The combined algorithm is therefore O(2n
2+2n · 2n) = O(2n2+3n). For an
exact enumeration approach this is a significant result, however it is still highly
intractable. Therefore, we think the algorithm is not really practical for larger
instances (for example for computing the weights for the 100 shareholders of a
company).
Fatima, Wooldridge and Jennings designed an iterative approximation algo-
rithm [7]. The algorithm shifts small amounts of power from players that have
too much power, to players that have too little power, according to a comparison
of the game’s power index with the target. The authors approximate the power
index using randomisation [8]. As a consequence the algorithm is O(n2) per iter-
ation. Their update rules have a property that makes the algorithm anytime: it
can be stopped at any iteration and every iteration gives a better or equal result.
Unfortunately, it is focused on the Shapley-Shubik power index [12]—which is
similar, but not equal to the Banzhaf power index.
Aziz, Paterson and Leech also designed an iterative approximation algorithm
[1]. Their algorithm is used to approximate the Banzhaf index, but instead of
calculating it directly they use generating functions [3]. This way the Banzhaf
index can be calculated efficiently, but only if the weights are integer. They
use interpolation of the current voting power and the desired voting power to
determine the next set of weights, multiply them with a certain factor and then
round them to integers. They don’t provide an analysis of the approximation
quality of their algorithm.
3.1 Laruelle-Widgre´n
In our paper we focus on the algorithm by Laruelle and Widgre´n. It is a rela-
tively simple algorithm that uses the fact that every input (the weight of the
player) has a corresponding output (the power of the player) and that there is
a correlation between input (weights) and output (power distribution) of the
Banzhaf algorithm – increasing or decreasing the input often leads to similar
changes in the output.
Using that fact, Laruelle and Widgre´n constructed an iterative algorithm. In
every step, they update the weights of the players by calculating the Banzhaf
index, calculating the ratio of the banzhaf index divided by the target power
index per player and then dividing the weight of each player by its corresponding
ratio. That way the weights are adjusted according to the error in the Banzhaf
index.
The target vector is used as the first set of weights. This makes sense because
the power and the weight distribution are roughly correlated. From this starting
point it is possible to iterate as many times as desired. A distance threshold
can be set so the algorithm will stop when it is close enough, and a maximum
number of iterations can be given to make sure the algorithm takes only a limited
amount of time.
4A pseudocode version of this algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. It takes as
input the vector ‘target’ (also called t below) and the numbers ‘maxDistance’ (the
distance threshold) and ‘maxIterations’ (the maximum number of iterations).
The vectors weight, banzhafIndex and ratio are all vectors of equal size equal to
the number of players.
Algorithm 1 Laruelle-Widgre´n
Require: The vector ‘target’ is a normalized vector of size n, with n > 0.
1: For each player i: weight(i)← target(i)
2: iterations← 0
3: repeat
4: banzhafIndex← calculateBanzhaf(weight)
5: For each player i: ratio(i)← banzhafIndex(i)
target(i)
6: For each player i: weight(i)← weight(i)
ratio(i)
7: distance← distance(banzhafIndex, target)
8: iterations← iterations + 1
9: until distance < maxDistance ∨ iterations > maxIterations
Ensure: weight is a vector of size n
The authors do not give any guarantees about the algorithm. In their paper
it is shown to give a good approximation for some cases, but the general case is
not analyzed.
4 Analysis
Besides the target power distribution t (called βfair by the authors of the al-
gorithm), the Laruelle-Widgre´n algorithm also requires a valuation function v.
The target power distribution must be a vector inside the regular Simplex, i.e. a
vector where the elements sum to 1, because in the computation of the ratio, t is
compared to normalized Banzhaf vectors, which are all elements of the regular
Simplex. The order of the elements in t does not matter for the algorithm, as a
reordering in the input simply leads to an equal reordering of the outputs. Thus,
without loss of generality we may assume the elements in the vector to be in
non-increasing order. Therefore, whenever we apply the algorithm to a vector t,
we take t to be an element of the ordered regular Simplex.
The authors consider four different valuation functions in their evaluation of
the EU voting system:
1. Unanimity vu, which returns a 1 iff all players are in the coalition.
2. Simple Majority vsm, which returns a 1 iff the size of the coalition exceeds 8
in the EU case, or dn2 e in general.
3. Qualified Majority vqm, which returns a 1 iff the weight of the coalition
exceeds 62 out of 87 points in the EU case, or quota q in general.
54. Qualified Majority with minimum size vqm+, which returns a 1 iff the weight
of the coalition exceeds 62 and the size exceeds 10 in the EU case, or quota
q and size s in general.
Since the valuation functions vu and vsm always return the same Banzhaf
power index regardless of the player weights, it is not interesting to consider
them for the algorithm as no improvement can be made by manipulating the
weights. Thus, for our analysis we will focus on the effect of vqm for different
choices of q. The valuation function vqm+ is also interesting to consider, however
it is more general than vqm since vqm is equal to vqm+ with s = 1, which makes
it harder to analyse. Section 4.1 presents our analysis of the expected effect of q
on the algorithm results.
We also want to investigate the effect of the initial weights determined in
step 1 of algorithm 1. We will refer to this initial weight vector as ω0, the weight
vector computed in iteration zero. The authors of the algorithm start with the
initial weights ω0 set to the target power distribution t, without any further
explanation as to why this choice was made. We propose an adaptation to the
algorithm where the choice of ω0 is also passed as a parameter, and investigate
the expected effect of three choices for ω0 in section 4.2.
4.1 Expected effect of q
The quota q determines when a coalition has enough weight to win. There has
been some work on the effect of manipulating the quota by Zuckerman et al. [13].
In particular, they show that the worst case difference in power under a change
in q is bounded for a given set of players. This is relevant when we consider what
will happen to the Banzhaf power of the initial weight, as it means that small
changes in q for a fixed ω0 produce stable changes in its power.
Our intuition is that q determines the average swinging coalition size, where
we call a coalition swinging iff it is winning but contains at least one player
which can make it losing by leaving the coalition. A good example of this effect
can be seen for the weights
[
1
n
1
n . . .
1
n
]
. Under these weights the power vector
is always the same since all players have equal weight. However the underlying
game changes with q. When q ≤ 1n every player can win on its own, and the
average swinging coalition size is 1 (when there is a coalition of two or more,
no single player can make it losing of leaving because the remaining players are
sufficient for winning, hence it is not a swinging coalition). When 1n < q ≤ 2n
every pair of players can win, and the average swinging coalition has size 2, and
so on.
If q determines the average size of the swinging coalitions, then the best value
of q should be 0.5. This is due to the fact that the number of possible coalitions
of a given size s out of n behaves as a binomial distribution, with the largest
number of possible coalitions occurring for s = 12n. Having more coalitions to
choose from is better because it gives a higher granularity in the Banzhaf vectors
available, which should lead to a Banzhaf vector that is closer to t. Because of
the nature of the binomial distribution, we expect q to behave symmetrically.
6Another way to analyze the effect of q is to look at its behavior for small
numbers of players. In particular, when the number of players is three, we can
visualize the Simplex in 2D. This is done in figure 1, for three different values of
q. Because we’re looking at the ordered Simplex, we only have to show the part
of the regular simplex where the value (in these figures we show both weights
and power) of the first player is not smaller than that of the second player, whose
value is not smaller than the third player’s. The figures show how different weight
vectors (points in the ordered simplex) map to the four available Banzhaf vectors
for 3 players (the four different colors), for three values of q (Figures a through
c). Only four Banzhaf vectors are attainable in WVGs on three players: [1, 0, 0]
(red, at the top), [ 12 ,
1
2 , 0] (blue, on the left), [
3
5 ,
1
5 ,
1
5 ] (green, directly below red),
and [ 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ] (yellow, directly below green).
[
1
2
1
2 0
]
[1 0 0]
[
3
5
1
5
1
5
]
[
1
3
1
3
1
3
]
(a) q = 1
2
[1 0 0]
[
3
5
1
5
1
5
]
[
1
2
1
2 0
] [
1
3
1
3
1
3
]
(b) q = 2
3
[1 0 0]
[
3
5
1
5
1
5
]
[
1
2
1
2 0
] [
1
3
1
3
1
3
]
(c) q = 3
4
Fig. 1. Mapping of weights to power index in the ordered Simplex for 3 players and
varying q.
As we can see in the figures, not all Banzhaf vectors are always represented
by 2D planes or segments of the Simplex. When q = 0.5 one Banzhaf vector
maps to a line (a green line between the red and the yellow areas), while another
(blue) maps to a point. When the first player has more weight than the quota
of 0.5, the others must have less and thus he becomes a dictator. On the other
hand, when he has less than 0.5 the same holds for the other two and no-one
can win without a second player. Thus only when the first player has weight
exactly equal to 0.5 can the other two vectors be reached. This is a challenge
for any iterative algorithm, since they must potentially converge to a very small
segment of the Simplex.
Also, from figure 1 we can see that the size of a segment of the Simplex
that maps to a specific Banzhaf vector does not behave linearly for increasing q.
Starting at q = 12 , the segment for β = [
1
3
1
3
1
3 ] first shrinks to a point towards
q = 23 , and then grows to be a plane again when q =
3
4 .
The meaning of such a 2D segment for the algorithm can be explained by
looking at the ratio calculation in step six. For any Banzhaf vector and the given
7target power distribution, the ratio is uniquely defined. In other words, when the
algorithm considers weights ω, the update operation is uniquely defined by the
Banzhaf vector that ω maps to. Where ω maps to is only controlled by parameter
q.
The particular challenge for the algorithm is that the update step weight =
weight
ratio is not always defined. When the Banzhaf power vector contains a 0 (red
or blue in figure 1) the ratio is also 0, and the algorithm cannot continue. Such
Banzhaf vectors appear only at the edges of the Simplex.
The effect of q on the algorithm is thus not easily predicted. On the one hand,
the algorithm does not always preserve weights, and therefore is not restricted
to exploring just the weight vectors in the Simplex. On the other hand, the size
differences between Banzhaf segments and existence of segments that stop the
algorithm poses challenges.
4.2 Expected effect of ω0
The authors of the original algorithm select the target vector t as initial weights
ω0 (the weights in the 0th iteration) under the implicit assumption that this
is a close guess to the final power distribution. However, we have seen in the
previous section that this can lead to initial weights that produce a powerless
player. This results in the algorithm dividing the weights by a zero ratio, and
thus stopping after only one iteration. This may lead to poor approximation,
and therefore this section attempts to find different guesses for ω0 to avoid this
situation.
When considering choices for ω0 we may try the vertices of the ordered
regular Simplex. However, all but one of the vertices contain at least one zero.
The ‘outer’ vertices of the regular Simplex thus immediately lead to a zero in
the Banzhaf vector. For the same reason we should avoid the edges and higher
dimensional ‘sides’ of the regular Simplex. This leads us to the intuition that a
good starting point is far from the edges.
The vertex of the ordered regular n-Simplex without a zero power player has
the form
[
1
n
1
n . . .
1
n
]
. This point is also the centroid of the regular Simplex. A
centroid is a type of center, intuitively defined as the average of all vectors in
the body, or alternatively as the center of its mass. The centroid of a general
Simplex is computed as the normalized sum of its n vertices (v0 through vn−1):
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
vi
This point seems to be a good candidate for ω0, as it is the furthest from
all sides. It is also the starting point used by the approximation algorithm of
Fatima et al. [7]. However, it actually leads to the same situation as choosing
the target vector, only one iteration later. The explanation for this is that when
all weights are equal the Banzhaf vector is the same as the weights. Then the
8computation for ω1, the weights in the first iteration, becomes (for each player):
ω1 =
ω0
ratio
=
ω0
β0
t
=
ω0
ω0
t
= t
However, we can still use the notion of centroid applied to the ordered Sim-
plex. This point is also far from all sides, and furthermore appears to be in
a region of the Simplex where there are many Banzhaf vectors. We base this
intuition on the views of Kurz [9] on the location of Banzhaf vectors in the or-
dered Simplex. Starting close to many Banzhaf vectors is desirable, because then
each iteration is likely to jump to a new Banzhaf vector which in turn results
in a slightly different ratio. Changing the ratio often introduces variance in the
direction of update which intuitively leads to better convergence.
The interior vertex can also be used in another way: We may manipulate
the starting weight vector based on the target vector t, so that it is less likely
to start with a powerless player. Players are powerless when they only have a
very small weight which in the Simplex means that some other players have a
very large weight. We can smooth this initial weight distribution by averaging
t with the interior vertex, intuitively ‘pulling’ the target t towards the center,
away from the zero edges. This initial weight vector ω0 is computed as
ω0 =
t+
[
1
n
1
n . . .
1
n
]
2
Because the relative effect of these alternative starting points on the perfor-
mance of the algorithm is hard to assess analytically, we evaluate them empiri-
cally. We consider three choices of ω0 in our evaluation.
1. Target, the starting point used by Laruelle and Widgre´n.
2. Centroid, the center of mass of the ordered Simplex.
3. Offset Target, the starting point halfway between the target and the centroid
of the regular Simplex.
Each choice attempts to satisfy different conditions. Starting point 1 is likely
closest to the desired power. Starting point 2 is in an area that is dense in
Banzhaf vectors. Starting point 3 attempts to combine both aspects.
4.3 Evaluation Metrics and Experimental Design
In this section we present the metrics used to evaluate the effect of various
parameter combinations. Since the purpose of the algorithm is to find a Banzhaf
vector βopt that is closest to the input target vector t it is natural to consider the
distance between t and the algorithm’s output, for some notion of distance. For
our evaluation we use the concept of Manhattan or Taxicab distance d1, or ||.||1.
We chose this distance norm because it relates to the results in [9] on the lower
bound on the distance between t and βopt, and because it is cheap to compute.
Formally:
d1(t, β) = ||t− β||1 =
n∑
i=0
|ti − βi|
9The maximum value of d1 in the regular Simplex is 2, for example when com-
paring
[
1 0 . . . 0
]
and
[
0 1 . . . 0
]
. In the ordered regular n-Simplex this maxi-
mum is 2− 2n , when comparing
[
1 0 . . . 0
]
and
[
1
n
1
n . . .
1
n
]
.
In order to illustrate our evaluation metrics, Figure 2 presents an example of
the distance between t and a number of related Banzhaf vectors. In the figure,
we consider the following Banzhaf vectors:
– βopt, an unknown optimal answer.
– βbest, a best known (closest) algorithm output found in a database of previ-
ously returned Banzhaf vectors.
– βalg i, the algorithm output for certain parameter settings i.
There may be more than one optimal answer, for example when for two players
the target t =
[
3
4
1
4
]
there exist two optimal Banzhaf vectors βopt =
[
1
2
1
2
]
and
βopt =
[
1 0
]
, both at distance 12 . Thus there can also be more than one best
known Banzhaf vector, for example when both βopt are present in the database.
A given algorithm parameter setting always produces the same result since the
algorithm is deterministic.
t
βopt
βopt
βbest
βalg 1
βalg 2
βalg 3
Fig. 2. Example of d1 distance between target vector t and related Banzhaf vectors in
2D. All points on a diamond are equidistant to t, according to the d1 distance metric.
We thus propose two metrics of interest:
1. The relative improvement obtained by using a parameter setting 2 compared
to 1,
d1(t, βalg 1)− d1(t, βalg 2)
d1(t, βalg 1)
2. The error in the output produced by a run of the algorithm defined as
d1(t, βalg i)− d1(t, βopt)
10
The relative improvement tells us something about the usefulness of a spe-
cific parameter setting. In other words, it tells us how the algorithm should be
used to get the best possible results. In figure 2 we can see that the point for
βalg 2 lies inside the black diamond indicating d1(t, βalg 1). Thus, it is an im-
provement over βalg 1. In the computation for improvement we do not compare
the points directly, but rather the distance to t, or the minimum Manhattan
distance between βalg 2 and a point on the diamond for βalg 1 in figure 2.
The improvement can be computed exactly since it only uses the known
vectors. We note that the improvement may be negative, for example in figure
2 this is the case for βalg 3 compared to βalg 1. We consider an improvement to
be significant if it exceeds 0.05.
The error tells us something about the general usefulness of the algorithm.
The error is the minimum Manhattan distance between two points on the green
and black diamonds in figure 2. Since we do not know βopt the error must be
estimated.
An upper bound on the error is d1(t, βalg i). This corresponds to the distance
between a point on the black diamond and t in figure 2. This upper bound is
tight, since it could be that t = βopt, in which case d1(t, βopt) = 0.
A lower bound on the error is d1(t, βalg i) − d1(t, βbest). In figure 2 it is the
minimum Manhattan distance between any two points on the black and blue
diamonds. This lower bound is also tight, since we may have stored the optimal
answer in which case βbest = βopt.
The upper bound d1(t, βalg i) is a biased estimate of the actual error, since
it is in general not the case that t = βopt. This is a consequence of the fact that
Banzhaf vectors are discrete. Kurz proves in [9] that there exists a lower bound
on the largest d1(t, βopt) of
1
9 , and conjectures that this bound is actually
14
34 .
The bias of the lower bound depends on the bias that originates from our
method of obtaining Banzhaf vectors. The quality of the lower bound further
depends on the percentage of all Banzhaf vectors we have in our database. We
generated Banzhaf vectors by running the algorithm on random samples and
storing the vector computed in each iteration of the algorithm (step four) until
the database remained constant for 250 samples. For 8 players this resulted in
1, 094, 138 Banzhaf vectors, which compared to the 2, 730, 164 weighted voting
games that exists for 8 players [6,9] means that there exists at least 1 vector for
every 2.5 games at this size.
The conjectured lower bound of 1434 on the largest distance between t and
βopt can be used to determine the size of a significant error for the upper bound
estimate. We say that the upper bound error of an algorithm (parameter setting)
is significant if the average value of the error exceeds 10% of 1434 , or
7
185 . Further,
we say a change in the error is significant if the difference exceeds 1% of the
maximum value of d1. Then a significant error for the lower bound estimate is
at least 1% of the maximum value of d1.
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4.4 Experiments
For our experiments we need a number of target vectors t to apply the algorithm
on. Since a target vector is a vector in the simplex, we produce samples t by
drawing a vector uniformly at random from the n-dimensional ordered regular
Simplex. If function U(0, 1) returns a value drawn uniformly at random from
the interval [0, 1], such a sample is constructed as:
for i ∈ (1, 2, ..., n), t˜(i) = − log (U(0, 1))
The elements from the vector t˜ are then normalized so that the resulting vector
t sums to 1:
for i ∈ (1, 2, ..., n), t(i) = t˜(i)n∑
j=1
t˜(j)
This results in a vector t that is a random vector in the regular Simplex. To
obtain a random vector in the ordered regular Simplex, the elements of the
vector t are sorted so that they are in descending order.
In order to evaluate empirically what choices of q and ω0 produce the best
results, we performed a number of experiments. For our experiments we drew
10, 000 samples from the ordered 8D Simplex. On each sample we applied the
algorithm for all choices of initial weight vector discussed in Section 4.2, and for
q ranging from 0.05 to 0.95 in steps of 0.05. Each parameter combination was
run for 50 iterations.
Figures 3 present the relative improvement obtained by running the algorithm
with varying values of q compared to running the algorithm with q = 0.5 for
each ω0. We expect q = 0.5 to be the best setting, and that the effect of q
is symmetric. Thus we expect the relative improvement to be negative when
q 6= 0.5, with equal magnitude on either side.
The figures show that the effect of q on the mean improvement is generally
symmetric. However, the algorithm does seem to perform better on values of
q > 0.5, with the best mean performance occurring for q = 0.65 for ω0 set to
the target, and q = 0.6 for the other choices of ω0. This average improvement on
q > 0.5 is only significant for ω0 set to the target. The asymmetry in the results
may be caused by the update rule of the algorithm. In step six, the weight is
updated as weight = weightratio . The ratio is independent of q as it is computed from
the normalized Banzhaf vector and the desired power. However the magnitude
of the weights is dependent on q since as q becomes smaller an equal change in
weights has a bigger relative effect.
Furthermore, choosing q 6= 0.5 results in significant improvements for the
majority of samples when q is chosen to be within 0.1 of 0.5 for all ω0. We
expect that this is caused by the reduction in the area of the ordered Simplex
that maps to the Banzhaf vector [1 0 . . . 0]. When q = 0.5 a weight vector maps
to [1 0 . . . 0] whenever the first player has weight of 0.5 or higher. As q increases
this area shrinks because the first player must have a higher weight to surpass
q. Conversely, when q decreases this area also shrinks because the other players
12
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(b) ω0 set to centroid
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(c) ω0 set to offset
Fig. 3. Distribution of relative improvement versus the algorithm with q = 0.5 for
varying q. Mean relative improvement indicated with a line.
need less weight to surpass q themselves. We suspect this gives the algorithm
more room to adjust the weights.
Figure 4 presents the effect of ω0 when q = 0.6. The y-axis shows the relative
lower bound error, computed as the lower bound on the error divided by the ini-
tial distance d1(t, β(ω0)), and the initial distance d1(t, β(ω0)) on the x-axis. This
should show if there is a correlation between the error and the initial distance
as produced by the choice of ω0.
Table 1 presents the key features of the data in figure 4. The first column
shows the method for selecting the initial weight vector for the algorithm. The
second column shows the average initial distance to t, and therefore the upper
bound on the average initial error. The third column presents the worst case
distance to t after applying the algorithm, and thus the worst case error. Columns
four and five present the average upper and lower bound error, where we note
the average upper error is the average distance to t after applying the algorithm.
ω0 Initial Worst Error Error Upper Error Lower
Target 0.1603 0.7988 0.1179 0.0899
Centroid 0.2535 0.6047 0.0803 0.0522
Offset 0.3146 0.4228 0.0833 0.0552
Table 1. Effect of the different choices for ω0 on the error.
The figures show how the initial distance is affected by the choice of ω0, with
ω0 set to the target having the smallest initial distance and offset having the
largest. For ω0 set to either target or offset a higher initial distance generally
results in a higher relative error, while for ω0 set to centroid the opposite appears
to happen where the higher initial distances are improved more.
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Fig. 4. Relative lower bound error compared to the initial distance for the varying ω0.
Another aspect of ω0 set to the target is that a large number of samples seem
to be unimprovable, which is visible as a large number of samples with relative
error near 1. This may be caused by samples starting in a segment with a 0
power player, which therefore cannot be improved beyond their initial guess.
The consequence of these unimprovable samples is that ω0 set as offset or
centroid gives a significant improvement in both the upper and lower bound
error compared to ω0 as target. However, the total magnitude of the error is
still significant in all cases. The difference between offset and centroid is not
significant, but offset does produce the lowest worst case distance to t, and it
can thus be seen as the most robust. Overall we can conclude that starting close
to the target is less important than starting in a position where the algorithm
can improve the result.
Because a large portion of samples could not be improved when ω0 is set
to the target vector, we want to examine how general this behavior is. For our
second experiment we varied the number of iterations from 1 to 100 for q = 0.6
and the three different choices of ω0. We drew 10, 000 samples from the 8D
Simplex and counted how often a sample t ended in a Banzhaf vector with a
zero power player for increasing number of iterations. This is a cumulative figure:
when the algorithm stops on sample t at i iterations performing i+ 1 iterations
will also stop the algorithm. Figure 5(a) contains the results, with the number
of iterations set on a log scale. Additionally, figure 5(b) shows the mean relative
improvement between iterations for this experiment, with the improvement also
set on a log scale.
Figure 5(a) shows that the choice of ω0 only has a significant effect on the
operation of the algorithm for the first 20 iterations. At 5 iterations the difference
between starting at the target and starting in the centroid of the ordered simplex
is still 10%, but this drops to less than 1% when the number of iterations is more
than 25. We can also see that starting in the centroid of the ordered Simplex
actually has the best chance of avoiding a zero power player initially. On the
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Fig. 5. Effect of increasing the number of iterations on the algorithm performance.
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other hand, setting ω0 as target gives a 20% chance to start with a zero power
player, which results in an unimprovable first guess.
In general, it is obvious that the number of cases where the algorithm stops
due to a 0 in the Banzhaf vector grows with the number of iterations, going
from more than 40% at 5 iterations to above 80% for 100 iterations. Further, the
effect of an iteration is only significant for the first 4 iterations. This means that
generally the algorithm will not manage to converge to the target value, and it
also suggests a possible area of improvement.
5 Improvements
In order to factor out the premature stop due to zeros in the Banzhaf vector we
propose and evaluate three possible changes:
1. Restarting the algorithm on different weights. By applying a different trans-
formation to the weights when a player has 0 power the algorithm can
‘restart’ on a new guess.
2. Imposing a minimum coalition size. By enforcing a minimum coalition size
powerless players in the original algorithm can become powerful by helping
a coalition reach its size quota.
3. Introducing a scaling factor in the coefficient computation. By enforcing a
strictly positive value for powerless players in the ratio computation we can
continue with the algorithm even when a player has no power.
The following sections describe these three improvements in more detail.
5.1 Multiple Start
As we have seen in figure 5(a), the algorithm 1 quickly encounters the situation
where computing the ratio results in a divide by zero from a player with 0 power
in its Banzhaf vector. To continue with the algorithm at this point, we may
try to find a different transformation to perform on the weights. The resulting
new weights are in effect a second guess, leading to a restart with better initial
weights. This procedure can then be repeated as often as we can make better
guesses, resulting in the Multiple Start version of the algorithm.
The restart guess should be a transformation on the weights discovered during
past iterations to make it meaningful. If the restart guess was not based off earlier
results, it would be possible to simply apply the original algorithm to this better
guess instead. It is also not useful to restart on a set of weights that has already
been tried, since the algorithm is deterministic.
A promising place to start from is the set of weights that produced the best
power distribution thus far. We propose to use the Offset Target procedure on
this set of best weights to obtain a new set of weights halfway between the
centroid of the regular simplex and the best weights, as shown in algorithm 2.
Our motivation for this choice is threefold:
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– We know from the exploration of the Banzhaf vector locations that the
majority is located near the center, and thus approaching our target from
the center out gives the best chance of finding a closer vector to jump to.
– In our initial experiments, the Offset Target heuristic provided good final
results, with the best worst case error and a robust average case.
– We can reason about its positive effect for some non-improvable samples. For
example, consider the case when the first player has all the power because
he has a weight 12 < w1 < 1− 1n . Then this operation brings his weight below
1
2 . Because the first player had the most weight, this means that all weights
are reduced to below 12 and no player can be a dictator in the transformed
sample.
We expect this version of the algorithm to never return a solution that is
worse than the standard version for the same number of iterations, since it uses
the standard version up until the first restart. Restarting may also provide a
bigger benefit when the standard algorithm frequently cannot improve beyond
the initial guess, which is for values of q near 0, 0.5 or 1. We know that in the
limit all inputs tend to go to a power vector with a zero power player, but if the
standard algorithm can perform many iterations, there may not be any room for
further improvement by starting somewhere else. Thus we expect this algorithm
is likely to produce the biggest improvement early on.
Algorithm 2 LW with Restarts (v, target, ω0, maxIterations, maxDistance)
Require: Target is a normalized vector of size n, with n > 0.
1: weight← ω0
2: bestweight← ω0
3: iterations← 0
4: distance←∞
5: repeat
6: banzhafIndex← calculateBanzhaf(v,weights)
7: For each player i: ratio(i)← banzhafIndex(i)
target(i)
8: if containsZero(banzhafIndex) then
9: For each player i: weight(i)← bestweight(i) +
1
n
2
10: else
11: For each player i: weight(i)← weight(i)
ratio(i)
12: end if
13: distance← distance(banzhaf, target)
14: if distance was improved then
15: bestweight← weight
16: end if
17: iterations← iterations + 1
18: until distance < maxDistance ∨ iterations > maxIterations
Ensure: weight is a vector of size n
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5.2 Minimum Coalition Size
Instead of recovering from a situation where a player has no power, we may try to
manipulate the algorithm so that it will not produce weights where a player has
no power. Laruelle and Widgre´n evaluate the EU for different rules, and some of
these rules have valuation functions that impose a minimum coalition size (for
example, QM+ requires 10 out of 15 countries to vote in favor). One aspect of
the minimum coalition size is that it gives power to players that normally would
not have any.
To show that this is the case, assume a weight distribution where only w1 > 0.
Even though player 1 has all the power, if we impose minimum coalition sizes of
2 and up, player 1 must form coalitions with others to win. In this way, the other
players get some power. Note that for minimum coalition sizes smaller than n
the others still get less power than player 1, since only he is present in all of these
coalitions. More generally, the number of possibly winning coalitions is 2n − 1
without restrictions, or
n∑
i=m
(
n
i
)− 1 for an imposed minimum coalition size m.
As a consequence, while this method can resolve cases where the Banzhaf
vector would otherwise contain zeros, it also restricts the number of Banzhaf
vectors available. For example, the vector [ 35
1
5
1
5 ] has four winning coalitions
[100], [011], [110], [101]. But the first coalition has size 1, so it would not be
winning if minimum coalition size were set to 2.
Therefore, we expect that imposing minimum coalition sizes sometimes pro-
duces worse results than the standard algorithm. Furthermore, when the min-
imum coalition size increases, fewer Banzhaf vectors are available, resulting in
larger errors. We can thus expect the ideal minimum coalition size to be relatively
small.
5.3 Scaling Factor
Another way to work around the case where a player has no power is to always
use a strictly positive update coefficient r. We may introduce a scaling factor s
in both the numerator and denominator of the calculation, i.e. ri =
βi+s
βfair+s
. This
ensures that for βi = 0 the coefficient is still a positive real.
The secondary effect of this scaling factor is that the magnitude of adjustment
is smaller, which leads to slower convergence. This may on its own also lead to
better results, since it reduces the risk of overshooting the target vector. On the
other hand, it will take more iterations to get to the desired value. Another risk
is that the algorithm no longer manages to jump out of local minima.
Since the scaling factor changes the operation of the algorithm, the effect
of this change is somewhat uncertain. We may expect better results when the
standard algorithm stops in one iteration due to a zero power player. Its effect
in general is more difficult to predict. We may need more iterations to get the
same or better results as the standard version, if convergence is indeed slower.
In other words, there is a possibility of returning worse results in general.
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6 Evaluation
Since each suggested improvement has its own parameters, we should look at the
effect of these parameters in isolation. To examine what relative improvement can
be obtained, we drew 10, 000 samples from the ordered 8D Simplex and compared
the result with that of the standard algorithm, with parameters q = 0.5, ω0 set
to target, and run for 50 iterations. For the restart improvement we increased the
number of iterations performed from 10 through 80. For the minimum coalition
improvement we varied the minimum coalition size from 1 through 8. And finally,
for the scaling improvement we varied the scaling factor from 0 through 7. Other
parameters set equal to the standard version. The results can be seen in figure
6.
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Fig. 6. Relative improvement for different parameter settings on the suggested im-
provements. In all cases q = 0.5, ω0 = t. Results for 10, 000 samples.
The results show that indeed not all improvements are universal improve-
ments. Both minimum coalition and scaling have samples that have worse dis-
tance than the base algorithm. The restart algorithm also needs at least the
same amount of iterations to obtain a universal improvement.
Minimum coalition has the largest fluctuation in performance, going from
significant improvement at 2 and 3 to almost always producing worse results at
5 and higher. This confirms our prediction that the imposed minimum coalition
size should be kept small.
Restarting shows very significant improvements (more than 0.2 in the mean)
when the number of iterations is 20 or higher. This means that the restart version
can typically be used with fewer iterations than the base version of the algorithm,
which can be important if runtime is a consideration.
The size of the scaling factor does seem to have a large impact on the quality
of improvement, but even for the factor set to 7 the algorithm shows very sig-
nificant improvement. Improvement for 1 and 2 exceeds 0.5. It may be that the
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high factors obtain the same quality results when the algorithm is given more
iterations, but in general it is better to use a small scaling factor.
A second experiment to look at the improvement compared to the input
parameter q was performed to determine how the new algorithms compare to
the original for sensible parameter settings. We again varied q from 0.05 to 0.95
and applied all the algorithms on 5, 000 new 8D samples. Each algorithm was
allowed 50 iterations, minimum coalition size was set to 3 and the scaling factor
was set to 0.4 for the respective algorithms. Figure 7 presents the results.
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Fig. 7. Effect of q on distance to target for the suggested improvements compared with
the original implementation, ω0 = t
From figure 7 it is immediately clear that a scaling factor is the superior
improvement, giving the best mean improvement for the entire range of q. We
can also see that the general asymmetry of the algorithm with respect to the
choice of q is maintained, with lower q behaving worse than higher q for all
algorithms. Interestingly, all algorithms show a peak in improvement when q =
0.5, supporting our intuition that it is the ideal selection of q. For scaling, setting
q = 0.5 actually produced the best absolute results. However, all algorithms
actually make the best improvement for very high q. This does not have much
practical use, since the original algorithm performs very poorly for such high q.
We see further confirmation of the effect of q on average coalition sizes when
looking at the results of minimum coalition. There, results are strongly negative
for low q, while almost no samples are affected for high q. This can be explained
by considering that for these low q the average coalition size is smaller than
the minimum imposed coalition size, while for high q almost no set of weights
produces a game with coalitions of size 3.
In order to be able to say something about the improvement of the proposed
additions with respect to the error we performed an experiment with tuned
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parameters for each. Every algorithm was run on 5, 000 samples of 8D Simplex,
with parameters set to produce the best results: 50 iterations, q = 0.6 except
for scaling which performed better for q = 0.5, ω0 set to centroid, minimum
coalition size 3, scaling factor 0.4. Table 2 contains the results. The first column
shows the algorithm under consideration. The second column details how many
of the samples were improved compared to the base, while the third contains
the amount of samples that were made worse. Column four shows how often an
addition produced strictly the best result compared to all the others, including
the base version. The fifth column presents the average distance to the target
vector. Column six displays the average distance to the best known power vector.
The last row of the table shows what the results would be like if we could always
pick the best algorithm for a sample.
Algorithm % Improved % Worse % Best Error upper Error lower
Base - - - 0.0801 0.0520
Coalition 23.6% 18.6% 3.6% 0.0761 0.0481
Restart 32.9% 0.0% 3.0% 0.0643 0.0363
Scaling 86.2% 12.0% 80.0% 0.0357 0.0078
Sum/Best - - 86.5% 0.0344 0.0065
Table 2. Effect of the improvements for ideal parameter settings.
In column four we can see that in 86.5% of the samples, one of the improve-
ments produced a game that was closest to t. For most samples scaling produced
the closest result, however all three improvements have samples they performed
best on. The base algorithm never produced a game closest to t since restarting
was given the same number of iterations as the base version, which means it
always produced at least the same output. However we can see in column three
that both coalition and scaling do produce output that is worse than the base
version in more than 10% of the samples.
The table shows that all additions reduce the error on average, however
the magnitude of improvement can only be considered significant for scaling.
Additionally, for scaling the upper bound on the error is below 7185 = 0.0378 . . .,
and the lower bound is below 0.5% of the maximum d1, which is 1.75 for 8
players. Therefore we can say that the error made by scaling is not significant
in size. Compared to the base algorithm with ideal parameters, introducing a
scaling factor improves the lower bound performance by a factor 6.5.
The other approaches have their own strengths, as restarting does not make
the result worse, and minimum coalition actually returns the best result more
often than restarting does. In a sense the approaches can be seen to comple-
ment each other. If we always take the best result, the improvement compared
with scaling is still another 20% in the lower bound which indicates it could be
worthwhile to find a new version of the algorithm that combines the effect of the
three approaches in some way.
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7 Conclusion and Future Work
The algorithm by Laruelle and Widgre´n works quite well in most cases, but
it has some major shortcomings. Our proposals remove the possibility of the
algorithm getting stuck in a case where one or more zeroes are in the weight
vector, and experiments show that our scaling factor algorithm also improve the
average approximation performance. However, in some cases it performs worse
than the original algorithm. Our multiple start proposal performs at least as well
as the original algorithm, but improves the solution not nearly as much as the
scaling factor algorithm. Further work could be done to find an algorithm that
improves on these proposals: either by giving a better worst-case performance
or by improving the average case approximation, or both.
Our experiments also show that the algorithm is not anytime: an iteration
often improves the solution, but it could also deteriorate. Our improvements
do not counter that, other than storing the best found solution. This is also
something that could be researched in the future.
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